What Is Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)?
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) platforms are often seen as the final line of defense for modern organizations. They are designed to detect anomalies, trace malicious behavior, and shut down threats before impact. But increasingly, attackers are not relying on traditional malware at all. They are using the system’s own trusted tools against it. These techniques, known as living off the land, allow threat actors to blend in and bypass even advanced EDR systems.
Living Off the Land: A Challenge for EDR
Living off the land attacks exploit pre-installed and trusted binaries commonly referred to as LOLBins. These include tools like PowerShell, MSHTA, CertUtil, WMI, Rundll32, and Regsvr32. Since these are signed by Microsoft and widely used by IT teams, they are rarely blocked or closely monitored. As a result, attackers use them to download payloads, execute code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges, all without dropping traditional malware files or triggering signature-based alerts.
A typical attack may begin with a foothold gained through phishing or a vulnerable web application. From there, attackers use PowerShell to load shellcode directly into memory using reflective DLL injection. This fileless execution avoids creating artifacts on disk that most EDR solutions rely on. The attacker might then perform process hollowing, injecting malicious code into a legitimate Windows process like svchost.exe or explorer.exe. The result is a payload running inside a trusted process, invisible to most static and signature-based analysis tools.
Credential Theft Beyond EDR Visibility
Credential dumping is often performed by accessing LSASS memory, either with custom tooling or by abusing built-in components like comsvcs.dll. One of the most well-known tools for this purpose is Mimikatz. It allows attackers to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets directly from memory. Even when EDR solutions block known Mimikatz binaries, attackers often load it in-memory using PowerShell or reflective DLL techniques to bypass detection entirely. Moreover, in many cases, adversaries use obfuscated or recompiled versions of Mimikatz to avoid signature-based detection, or they extract only the required functionality and embed it into custom tooling. These methods make it extremely difficult for traditional EDR systems to detect credential theft in progress.
Lateral Movement Using Native Tools
For lateral movement, attackers often rely on WMI, scheduled tasks, or PsExec. These are all legitimate administrative tools that rarely raise red flags unless paired with very specific behavioral triggers. Once inside the network, attackers can move silently, escalate privileges, and access sensitive data without ever writing a malicious binary to disk.
Why EDR Alone Is Not Enough
In several red team engagements, we have demonstrated how attackers can operate undetected in live environments for days. Because every action mimics standard administrative behavior, EDRs do not trigger alerts. There are no malware signatures, no suspicious binaries, and no unusual network traffic. Just native tools used in very specific, well-timed ways.
Organizations that rely entirely on EDR for detection and response are exposed to serious blind spots. Default rules and vendor baselines often miss this class of attack. To detect these tactics, teams need advanced telemetry, enhanced logging, strict PowerShell auditing, and active threat hunting. Even with all that in place, it takes expertise to separate signal from noise when an attacker uses only trusted components.
Testing Your EDR Against Real Threats
The only reliable way to assess your resilience is to simulate the threat. Red teaming and adversary emulation provide real-world testing of your EDR’s ability to detect and respond to fileless and stealth-based attacks. At Seclinq, we specialize in red team assessments that mirror the tactics of real adversaries using living off the land strategies. If you have never tested your detection capabilities against this approach, you may be overestimating your protection.
If your EDR has never been challenged like this, now is the time.